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Plaintiffs

Jeff

Christensen

and

Kyle

James

Fausett

submit

the

following Reply Memorandum in support of this appeal.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In

the

Brief

of

Appellants,

Mr.

Christensen

and

Mr.

Fausett

challenged Defendant Burns to demonstrate that this case has no genuine
issues of material fact and that it is entitled to summary judgment as a
matter of law.

Defendant Burns' brief fails to answer this challenge.

Thus,

for example, in response to the assertion that it lacks the facts necessary to
support

its

motion,

Burns

wording of the other six.

adds

four

more

statements

However, Defendant

and

alters

still furnishes

the

only a

smattering of facts which simply fail to outline Ms. Swenson's scope of
employment.

Since the critical issue in this case concerns whether Ms.

Swenson acted within the scope of employment while on a short break, the
Court must consider the employer's policies and instructions

involving

breaks from work, as well as employee practice on these matters.
"The burden of showing that there is no 'genuine issue of material
fact'

rests with the party seeking a summary judgment in its

Singer v. Wadman. 595 F. Supp. 188, 269 (D. Utah 1982).
Appellants,

Mr. Christensen

and

Mr. Fausett

favor."

In their Brief of

cite testimony

depositions to refute various facts presented by Defendant.

from

the

Instead of

responding to each of these charges, Defendant Burns merely selects a few
of Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett's facts and attacks them, all the while
maintaining that no dispute exists.

Moreover, three of the four new facts

which Defendant added in its Brief of Appellee are either misleading or
inadequate.
Besides failing to establish the lack of factual disputes, Defendant
1

also fails to establish that it is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.

The

facts simply demonstrate that Ms. Swenson planned and carried out her
visit to the Frontier Cafe in a manner suited to her employer's convenience.
Therefore, it cannot be said that she acted in a wholly personal endeavor.
If anything, the short break she took to pick up a cup of soup was merely
incidental to job responsibilities.
In outlining the second criterion under the Clover/Birkner

analysis,

Defendant emphasizes that an employee must be within the normal spatial
boundaries of employment.

This clearly is not the standard.

As the Clover

Court emphasized, the employee need only be substantially

within those

boundaries.

Not only does Defendant distort the Clover/Birkner analysis, it

also mischaracterizes Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett's arguments made
on this point.

Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett do not argue that in the

Clover case Mr. Zulliger's duties restricted him to one restaurant, nor do
they argue that the Clover Court ignored this alleged fact.

To the contrary,

Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett acknowledge that Mr. Zulliger's duties took
him to both restaurants.

They emphasize, however, that the accident

occurred at a some distance away from the locale of his responsibilities
and that the Clover Court did not find this departure significant.

Similarly,

in this case, Ms. Swenson brief departure from the area of her duties does
not take her outside the "substantial normal spatial boundaries."
Finally, Defendant argues that the second trip test must be applied in
this case.

It does not make sense to apply this test every time an

employee deviates from his or her immediate work responsibilities.

Thus

for example, whether an employee takes a latrine break, gets up to stretch,
or walks to the vending machine to buy a cup of soup, it would be
ridiculous to ask if a second person would need to make the same trip.
2

These incidental actions of the employee briefly

attending to personal

comfort needs do not take him or her out of the scope of employment.
Whether as an incidental action or under the personal detour approach,
Ms.

Swenson

responsibilities.

could

not

be

said

to

have

totally

abandoned

her

Carter v. Bessey. 97 Utah 427, 93 P.2d 490, 492 (Utah

1939) ("A slight deviation from order or attending incidentally to other
business than the master's, but which does not dissever the servant from
the master's business does not relieve the master from liability for the
servant's negligence.").

ARGUMENT
POINT I: DEFENDANT BURNS FAILS IN ITS 'STATEMENT OF
RELEVANT FACTS' TO RESOLVE THE FACTUAL CONFLICT IN
THIS CASE.
In its Brief of Appellee, Defendant

Burns offers

a Statement of

Relevant Facts with the alleged purpose of "adding to the Statement of
Facts set forth in Appellants' Brief."

(Brief of Appellee at 3).

Rather than

merely adding to Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett's account of the events,
however, Defendant's
conflict

Statement of Relevant Facts serves to cement the

and dispute over the facts in this case.

In response to the

argument that Defendant's list of facts is inadequate, Burns not only alters
the wording of its original six statements, it also adds four more facts.
Even with these additions, however, Defendant's statement of facts stands
incomplete, and in dispute.
Thus, for example, Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett point to new fact
8 as inaccurate and misleading.

There Defendant states that Ms. Swenson

3

admitted that picking up a cup of soup was a personal choice.
Appellee at 4).
obtaining

(Brief of

However, when asked again and pushed to admit that

the soup involved

a personal

choice,

Ms. Swenson

finally

responded "I guess if you are hungry, that's your choice." (Swenson Depo.
at 24, lines
statement

6-7, attached

does

not mean

abandoning work.

as Addendum
that

1).

Ms. Swenson

More importantly,
viewed

her

this

actions

as

In fact, when asked if she believed she was on a

personal errand, Ms. Swenson testified:

"No.

I was doing my job."

(Swenson Depo. at 23, lines 16-19, Addendum 1).
Similarly, Defendant's

new facts 2 and 3 give only part of the

material information in this case.

In these statements, Defendant attempts

to limit Ms. Swenson's scope of employment to actions that take place
solely within the geographical boundaries of the Geneva Plant.
the Appellee at 3).

(Brief of

As discussed in Point 2B of Appellants' Brief, and Point

3 of this brief, the test ior scope of employment not only encompasses
actions on the premises, but also those substantially
boundaries.

Hence,

while

Defendant's

statements

within the spatial
setting

out

those

boundaries may reflect the truth, they do not provide the whole picture.
Not only does Defendant furnish disputed facts, 1 it also challenges
the facts in this case by directly attacking some of the facts offered by Mr.
Christensen
"Appellants'

and Mr. Fausett.
Statement

immaterial ....").

of

(Brief

Facts

are

of Appellee

at 6, stating

mischaracterized,

misleading

that
or

As the evidence demonstrates, Defendant cannot discount

the facts while maintaining that no dispute exists.
1 Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett challenge Defendant's original statement of facts in the
Brief of Appellant, Point 1.

4

Defendant's assault on Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett's Statement
of the Facts comes in two forms.

First, Defendant tries to discredit the facts

which concern actions taken by employees in Ms. Swenson's role, i.e., gate
guards.

Second, Defendant endeavors to eliminate facts involving the use

of the Frontier Cafe by Burns employees other than gate guards.
The latter part of statement 13 illustrates Defendant's direct attack
on the role of gate guards.

There, Defendant disputes Mr. Christensen and

Mr. Fausett's claim that Ms. Swenson and other guards checked with each
other before ordering lunch and that they occasionally brought
back for those who ordered.

(Brief of Appellee at 7).

lunches

While admitting that

Ms. Swenson distributed lunches to guards at the gates, Defendant argues
that she did so only as a rover, on graveyard shift, and only after the
accident.

(Id..)

The depositions describe, however, that even before the day of the
collision the gate guards inquired with each other when ordering and
picking up lunches.

Specifically, on page 55 of her deposition, Ms. Swenson

confirms that "people at Gate 4 would take turns to go over to the Frontier
Cafe and pick up lunches for each other."
Appellants).

Moreover, she testified

(See

Exhibit 5, Brief of

that the guards sometimes walked

across the street for this task and sometimes drove.

(Id.)

In statement 14, to support of its position that the gate guards did
not pick up lunches for each other, Defendant refers to Oreon Olsen's
deposition in which he claims that he doesn't recall any of the guards
bringing back food from Frontier Cafe to other guards.
of Appellants, Olsen Depo. at 27-28).

(See Exhibit 4, Brief

However, Ms. Swenson's testimony

disputes this, as shown in the preceding paragraph.

Furthermore, Mr.

Olsen himself testifies later in his deposition that "I could go over and get a

5

lunch or have someone pick it up"

(See Exhibit 4, Brief of Appellants,

Olsen Depo. at 33, lines 6-7, emphasis added).

In addition, although he

refused her offer, Ms. Swenson testified that on the day of the accident she
checked with Mr. Olsen to see if he wanted her to bring back lunch for him.
(See Exhibit 5, Brief of Appellants, Swenson Depo. at 17, lines 21-23).
In statement 17, Defendant refers to Eugene Bezzant's deposition to
establish that the gate guards considered a visit to Frontier Cafe to pick up
lunch as a personal errand.

(Brief of Appellee at 8).

above, Ms. Swenson emphatically rejected this position.
the task as part of her job.

Yet, as discussed
She considered

("I was doing my job." Swenson Depo. at 23,

lines 16-19, Addendum 1).
Finally in statement 18, Defendant disputes Mr. Christensen and Mr.
Fausett's claim that Burns Management knew that the gate guards used
Frontier Cafe for breaks.
Transtrum

observed

such

(Brief of Appellee at 8, arguing that Mr.
use

among

rovers

only.)

Eugene

Bezzant

testified, however, that the management knew because, "occasionally they
would come to the gate at the time we were at the place picking up a lunch
or whatever we were picking up." (See Exhibit 7, Brief of Appellants,
Bezzant Depo. at 18, lines 14-23).

Moreover, when asked whether the

management knew that the guards used their own vehicles to "hustle over"
to the Frontier Cafe, Ms. Swenson declared, "I'm sure they did."
Exhibit 5, Brief of Appellants, Swenson Depo. at 55, lines 18-22).
addition, Ms. Swenson reaffirmed

(See
In

that the management must have known

that prior to the accident, Burns employees, including gate guards, used
Frontier Cafe.

("I'm

sure they did.

The lieutenants themselves went

there." See Exhibit 5, Brief of Appellants, Swenson Depo at 43, 15-20).
Not only does Defendant dispute Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett's
6

facts concerning the role of the Frontier Cafe in relation to gate guards, it
also attempts to exclude the link between other Burns employees and the
Cafe.

Specifically, Defendant labels the relationship between the Cafe and

rovers, management, and those on other than day shifts as immaterial.

As

Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett argued in their previous brief, these facts
are material.

They serve to define the arena in which Ms. Swenson's scope

of employment exists.
Consequently,

contrary

to

Defendant's

position

in

its

Brief

of

Appellee, material facts include the following uses of the Frontier Cafe:
1) Ms. Swenson brought food back from the Frontier Cafe to her
lieutenant while on graveyard shift (Brief of Appellee at 6);
2) rovers picked up lunches from the Frontier Cafe for single staffed
posts (Brief of Appellee at 6-7);
3)

company

officials

from

Salt

Lake

City

held

meetings

with

lieutenants at the Frontier Cafe (Brief of Appellee at 7);
4) lieutenants picked up food from the Frontier Cafe for meetings
with lieutenants and captains (Brief of Appellee at 8); and
5) Captain Transtrum observed rovers using Frontier Cafe for lunch
and latrine breaks (Brief of Appellee at 8).
Each of these admitted facts, plus the numerous others already cited
by Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett in the Brief of Appellants, come
together

to create

an

impression

in

the

minds

of

Burns

employees.

Through their use of the Cafe, in official, semi-official, and casual ways,
Burns employees endow it as an extension of their workplace, much like a
company cafeteria.

Hence, facts on how Burns generally used the Frontier

Cafe are important, as Defendant notes, in determining the legal rights of
the parties and to establish liability of the employer.

7

(Brief of Appellee at

10-11).
Finally, in their Brief of Appellants, Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett
refer to and quote from testimony in the depositions to refute the original
facts provided by Defendant.
these charges.

Defendant simply fails to respond to most of

(See, e.g.. Brief of Appellants at 7-8, attacking original fact

6).
POINT 2: MS. SWENSON ACTED FOR THE CONVENIENCE OF HER
EMPLOYER AND THUS HER VISIT TO THE FRONTIER CAFE
CANNOT BE CONSIDERED WHOLLY A PERSONAL ENDEAVOR.
Incredibly, Defendant argues that Ms. Swenson's visit to the Frontier
Cafe was wholly "a matter of personal convenience." (Brief of Appellee at
14.).

Ignoring the following factors, Defendant persists in maintaining that

Burns had no control or influence in Ms. Swenson's actions:
1.

Burns gave no scheduled breaks.

2.

The company provided no place on the premises for employees to

purchase their food.
3.

The company expected its employees to work as much as possible

throughout their shifts but paid them during any breaks taken.
4.
her

On the day of the collision, Ms. Swenson waited for a slow time in

responsibilities.
5.

Following company practice, she checked to see if fellow-guard

Oreon Olsen wanted something to eat.
6.

Ms. Swenson telephoned the nearest food facility using a menu

posted at Gate 4.
7.

She ordered a cup of soup and then drove across the street in

order to be back at Gate 4 as quickly as possible.

8

8.

She stayed only long enough to pay for the soup.

9.

She intended to bring the soup back to her post rather than eat it

at the cafe.
Obviously, if Ms. Swenson had taken her lunch break as a matter of
personal convenience, she might of at the very least taken more time,
eaten at the cafe, or even selected a different time, or place, or manner of
transportation.

In fact, as both Ms. Swenson's direct supervisor, Kim

Hancey, and her captain, Mike Transtrum, testified:
taking a lunch break benefits the company.

a Burns employee

(Hancey Depo. at 50, lines 21

though 51, line 10, attached as Addendum 2; Transtrum Depo. at 80, line
16 through 82, line 3, attached as Addendum 3).
argued

that a lunch break benefits

Although it might be

the employer no matter what the

circumstances, in this case where Ms. Swenson planned and conducted her
hurried break specifically out of concern for and at the convenience of her
employer, the break becomes merely incidental to work.
Even with personal acts, many courts have held that when

this

conduct is tied to the workplace, it falls within the scope of employment.
As the court in Travelers Ins. Co. v. SCM Corp., explained:
In determining the scope of employment for purposes of
the respondeat
superior doctrine, courts have long considered
certain "personal" activities to be so necessary, usual, and
closely tied in to the workplace that they are considered to be
within the scope of employment. See, e.g.. Brown v. Anzalone,
300 F.2d 177 (3d Cir. 1962) (lighting a fire to say warm);
George v. Bekins Van & Storage Co.. 33 Cal.2d 834, 205 P.2d
1037 (1949) (smoking); J.C. Pennev Co. v. McLaughlin. 137 Fla.
594, 188 So. 785 (1939) (going to restroom).
600 F. Supp. 493, 500 (D.D.C 1984).

Similarly, in Alma v. Oakland Unified

School Dist.. the court stated that acts necessary to an employee's "comfort,

9

convenience, health, and welfare while at work, though strictly personal,"
do not take him or her outside the scope of employment. 176 Cal. Rptr.
287, 289 (Cal Ct. App. 1981).
Nonetheless, Defendant argues that it did not direct Ms. Swenson to
go

to

the

cafe

nor

were

there

duties

for

her

to

perform

there.

Consequently, Defendant asserts, she must have been on a personal errand
completely

outside

the

scope

of employment.

Under

this

reasoning,

however, every small departure would be a personal errand outside the
scope of employment.

As noted in the preceding paragraph, the cases

simply reject such a strict standard.

See also. DeMirjian

v. Ideal Heating

Corp.. 278 P.2d 114, 118 (Cal. Dist C. App. 1955) ("Cessation of work for
eating, drinking, warming himself, and similar necessities are necessary
incidents of employment.").
Moreover,

Defendant's

attempt to classify

Ms. Swenson's

rushed

break as wholly a personal errand ignores the plain facts in Clover
Snowbird

Resort. 808 P. 2d 1037 (Utah 1991).

v.

There, the employer

instructed the employee to check on a restaurant part way up the ski
slope. After

performing his duties, and in a different

locale, the employee

engaged in personal skiing and at that time collided with another skier.
Like Ms. Swenson, the employee in Clover received no directives to ski to
another part of the mountain, nor did he have duties that would require
him to continue skiing for four additional runs.

At the time of the collision,

the Clover employee clearly was not on company business.

Nonetheless,

the Utah Supreme Court found that neither was he wholly on a personal
errand.

Id. at 1041.

10

POINT 3: DEFENDANT BURNS MISCHARACTERIZES THE SECOND
CRITERION OF THE BIRKNER/CLOVER TEST AND PLAINTIFFS'
ARGUMENT.
Defendant's position throughout this case has been that Ms. Swenson
left the physical boundaries of the Geneva plant and therefore cannot be
found within the scope of her employment.

In attacking Mr. Christensen

and Mr. Fausett's arguments on this point, Burns asserts that "[i]t would be
disingenuous for plaintiffs to argue that the normal

spatial

boundaries

of

the employment of Ms. Swenson were beyond the physical boundaries of
the Geneva plant ...." (Brief of Appellee at 17, emphasis added).
The Utah Supreme Court in Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, however,
explicitly

rejected

the

narrow

standard

now

advocated

by

Defendant.

There, like Defendant in this case, Mrs. Clover argued for a holding that
employees who have fixed places of work should be considered
outside of their employment when off the employer's premises.
1037, 1043 (Utah 1991).

acting

808 P.2d

The court declined to adopt the approach, noting

that to do so would focus the analysis on one criterion to the exclusion of
the other two criteria listed in Birkner. IdL
employee need only be substantially
of his or her employment.
act

outside

substantially

the

within

its

within the normal spatial boundaries

IdL. at 1040.

physical

In other words, an employee may

parameters

boundaries,

Instead, the Court held that an

and

of

employment
hence,

within

and

still

be

the

scope

of

of

the

employment.
In

addition

Birkner/Clover

to

mischaracterizing

the

second

criterion

test, Defendant also falsely summarizes Mr. Christensen

and Mr. Fausett's arguments.

In referring to their analysis of the Clover

case, Burns claims that "Plaintiffs mistakenly argue that the Supreme Court

11

ignored the fact that Mr. Zulliger's spatial boundaries restricted him to the
Plaza Restaurant."

It also points out that the Court recognized that Mr.

Zulliger had responsibilities at both the Plaza and the Mid-Gad restaurants.
(Brief of Appellee at 17).

Significantly, Defendant fails to cite the pages in

the brief where Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett make this argument.
In actuality, Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett explicitly refer to the
Court's recognition that Mr. Zulliger had duties at both restaurants.

See

Brief of Appellants at 17 ("On the day of the accident, the Court found it
important that Mr. Zulliger had been following instructions to inspect the
second restaurant ...."); and 21 (The Court pointed out that Mr. Zulliger
"was on property owned by his employer and at times he had been asked
to monitor the other restaurant when not working ....").

In fact,

this

element is essential to Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett's point, which
Defendant appears to have missed.
completed his duties at both
Mrs.

Clover

occurred

Appellants at 21;

The brief explains that Mr. Zulliger had

of these restaurants and the collision with

at a spot above

either restaurant.

Clover, 808 P.2d at 1042.).

(Brief

of

Nonetheless, even though

Mr. Zulliger no longer attended to duties at either restaurant and was no
longer

in

their

immediate

vicinity,

the Court

still

held

that he

was

substantially within the normal boundaries of his employment.2
2 Defendant provides no support for its unusual premise that the "entire Snowbird Ski
Resort" constitutes the normal spatial boundaries of employment for chefs at the resort's
restaurants. (Brief of Appellee at 17). By contrast, the Utah Supreme Court merely holds that
while skiing, Mr. Zulliger was substantially within those boundaries. Clover. 808 P.2d at
1042.
Moreover, nowhere in the Clover opinion does the Court hold that Mr. Zulliger's normal
job included "skiing the slopes." (Brief of Appellee at 17). The most that can be drawn from
the Court's opinion is that employees skied as a mode of travel between the restaurants. Clover.
808 P.2d at 1043. And, when he collided with Mrs. Clover, Mr. Zulliger was not between the
two restaurants. Jd. at 1042. It simply does not fit the facts to argue, as Defendant has, that
Snowbird hired Mr. Zulliger to ski outside the areas between the two restaurants.

12

Furthermore,
Clover,

the

determining

based

Utah

whether

upon

Supreme

its treatment
Court

clearly

of

the working

rejected

an employee acts substantially

boundaries of employment.

a rigid
within

hours in
rule

for

the normal

In C l o v e r . Mr. Zulliger had arrived at the

resort in order to spend time skiing before his normal working hours.
Clover. 808 P.2d at 1039.

Once there, his employer asked him to check

the second restaurant, and after doing so he began to ski on his own time.
The Court noted that Mr. Zulliger was heading down the mountain to
"begin" work.
his

IcL at 1039.

That is, he was not within the normal hours of

employment.
POINT 4: THE SECOND TRIP TEST DOES NOT APPLY TO THE
FACTS OF THIS CASE
Defendant argues that Ms. Swenson's conduct in visiting the Frontier

Cafe was not motivated in part by the purpose of serving her employer.
(Brief of Appellee at 20).

To analyze Ms. Swenson's motivations, Defendant

contends that the Court must use the second trip test.
the Utah Supreme Court in C l o v e r

(Id. at 20-21).

As

noted, this test is useful when an

employee travels away from work with both a personal and a business
motive.

808 P.2d at 1041, citing Whitehead

Insurance. 801 P.2d 934 (Utah 1989).
Whitehead

v. Variable

Annuity

Life

Thus, for example, the employee in

was commuting to home when he became involved in an

accident that injured the plaintiff.

In those type of circumstances, the

court

would

asks

whether

the

employer

have

had

to

send

another

employee over the same route or to perform the same task if the trip had
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not been made.

id.

Nothing constrains a court to use the second trip test.
Clover

court emphasized, this variation from B i r k n e r

In fact, as the
criterion

merely

serves as a method of applying the facts in specific circumstances.

808

P.2d

the

at

1040-41.

The

important

requirement

remains,

whether

employee's conduct is motivated at least in part by the purpose of serving
the employer's interests.
Because

the

Ld. at 1040.

second

trip test focuses

on

travel

away

from

the

workplace, in cases where the employee remains substantially within the
normally spatial boundaries of employment, the test provides little help.3
For example, it makes no sense to ask whether the employer would have
needed to send a second employee on a latrine break if the first employee
had not made such a trip.

This would be true whether the employee used

a latrine on the premises, or one equally close but outside the physical
boundaries of work.4

Similarly, in this case, Ms. Swenson's momentary

break from work to pick up a cup of soup was such a slight departure from
her work responsibilities, the second trip test does not make sense given
the facts.

Carter v. Bessev. 97 Utah 427, 93 P.2d 490, 492 (Utah 1939) ("A

slight deviation from order or attending incidentally to other business than
the master's, but which does not dissever the servant from the master's
business

does

not relieve

the master

from

liability

for

the

servant's

negligence.").
3 Although the Clover court at first analyzed Mr. Zulliger's actions under the second trip test,
it recognized that the case was better suited to the personal detour approach. 808 P.2d at 1042.
4 Eugene Bezzant testified that Gate 4 lies equally distant from the Frontier Cafe and Lower
Gate 4, which is the site of the nearest on-premise restroom facility. Bezzant Depo. at page 9,
line 22 through page 10, line 13, attached as Addendum 4.
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The critical inquiry remains whether Ms. Swenson was motivated at
least in part, by the purpose of serving Defendant's interest.

And, as the

facts discussed in Point 2 above, illustrate-Ms. Swenson took her break at
Burns convenience and in a way that at least partly served its needs.
However, if another approach is merited, a better method for analyzing Ms.
Swenson's conduct appears under the personal detour doctrine.

Courts

may follow this approach when the employee's activity does not involve a
commute, as in Whitehead, or a journey away from work.
In the personal detour approach, and under circumstances like this
one, the court looks to see if in taking a personal detour away from work
responsibilities the employee completely abandons his or her employment.
Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort. 808 P.2d 1037, 1042 (Utah 1991).

In this

case, Ms. Swenson's own testimony reflects her belief about picking up the
soup in relation to her work.

Instead of viewing her decision to obtain the

soup as abandoning work, she resolutely stated:

"No.

I was doing my job."

(Swenson Depo. at 23, lines 16-19, Addendum 1).5

CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons set forth above, and those detailed in the Brief
of Appellants, Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett respectfully requests the
Court to overturn the lower court's grant of summary judgment.

5 See also Brief of Appellant at Point 2C for a more detailed analysis of the personal detour
approach as applied to the facts in this case.
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ADDENDUM 1
EXCERPTS OF GLORIA SWENSON'S DEPOSITION

1

your lunch; is that a fair assessment?

2

A

Yes.

3

Q

That was up to the guard to determine whether he or

4

she would go off the premises and get the lunch or just bring

5

their lunch in?
MR. HARRIS:

6

Objection.

Leading.

7

Q

Do you understand the question?

8

A

Well, I can tell —

9

what I can tell you, there is

some days we had lunches, some days we did not.

10

other of us went for a cup of soup.

11

what you had time for.

12
13
14
15
16
17

Q

One or the

That was our lunch.

That's

Sometimes the guard would bring his or her own lunch

in; is that right?
A

Yes.

A lot of time it was shared because you never

got a break to have anything.
Q

Did you consider that if you chose to go across and

get a cup of soup that you were on a personal errand?
MR. HARRIS:

18

That's leading again.

19

A

No.

20

Q

Were you told to go get a cup of soup?

21

A

No, I was never told to go get a cup of soup.

22

Q

Did you consider that part of your —

23

A

But I know that you are entitled to a lunch hour.

24

Q

Okay.

25

I was doing my job.

Let me ask you this. And you made the

personal choice to go get a cup of soup, right?

23
Associated Merit ©*»««•«

1

A

I went for lunch, yes.

2

Q

And you were not directed to go get a cup of soup by

3
4

anyone at Burns?
A

No.

5

MR. HARRIS:

Objection.

Leading still.

6

Q

That was your personal choice, was it not?

7

A

I guess if you are hungry, that's your choice.

8

Q

Sure.

9

And that wasn't part of your job description

to go get a lunch at the Frontier, was it?

10

MR. HARRIS:

Same objection.

Leading.

11

A

I don't know what you are reaching for other than —

12

Q

Just answer the question is all I'm asking.

13
14

MR. HARRIS:
don't answer it.

If you don't understand the question,

Have him reask it.

15

A

Reask it again.

16

Q

Was it your understanding that you had the personal

17
18

choice to either bring your lunch in or to go off and get it?
A

Yes.

19
20

MR. HARRIS:
Q

Objection.

Leading.

Tell me what you did from the time that you left to

21

the time that you got involved in the accident.

22

happened.

Tell me what

Just walk us through that sequentially.

23

A

I made a phone call over to have the cup of soup

24

ready.

25

picked it up.

That's what I had, one cup of soup.

And I walked in

24

ADDENDUM 2
EXCERPTS OF KIM S. HANCEY'S DEPOSITION

50

gate?
A

Right.

Q

Under that circumstance, the rover comes over

and sits there for 15 minutes while he takes his break or
eats his lunch or smokes a cigarette?
A

No, nobody gets by.

Q

Exactly.

Now, leaving that, we've already

established that going to where you have two people at gate
4, for example, I don't know that there's two people at
uther posts, but gate 4 during a day shift when one person
leaves and leaves at such a time to go on break, leaves at
such a time that it ion't in violation of the shift change,
they aren't needed over on the other ar*a# okay, when that
person leaves for those 10 or 15 minutes and you still have
the other person at gate 4, all right?
A

Okay.

Q

Under those circumstances, it is true, is it

not, that your contract, your meaning Burns* contract, is
being met with regards to Geneva Steel?
A

Yeah.

Q

Thank you.

And you also agree, do you uot/ that

it is important that employees are given a few aiinutea,
we've talked about here, to have a break during the day?
A

Uh-huh,

Q

That's beneficial to the employee, obviously?

mM*rTTF*T7.ED TRANSCRIPT
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A

Yes, it is.

Q

And it's always beneficial to Burns Security?

A

Yes-

Q

Correct?

A

Uh-huh.

Q

And whether that break i s to r e l i e v e

themselves

or j u s t get a breath of fresh a i r , whether i t ' s to e a t ,

all

those things are important to the i n d i v i d u a l and to Burns
Security?
A

Yes, i t i s *

Q

Arp yftu familiar with any security employees,

lieutenants or otherwise that have been

disciplined for

leaving the facility?
m.

WILLIAMS:

THE WITNESS:

That's asker! and answered.
Excuse me

MR- WILLIAMS:

It's just an objection.

I

believe it's been asked and already answered.
THE WITNESS;
Q

Yeah.

(By Mr. Harris)

My previous question was very

limited with regards to the specifics of what Gloria did
that day, where she was ^ust gone a very few minutes over
and back.

I'm talking about —

question to that.

I'm not limiting my

I'm talking about are you familiar with

anyone who has been disciplined under your watches for
leaving the facility?

COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT

ADDENDUM 3
EXCERPTS OF MICHAEL TRANSTRUM'S DEPOSITION

A

Except as directed by specific instructions,

that would be an exception.
MR. HARRIS: Thank you.

I also asked last

time, I guess I need to write a letter to get it
memorialized, because you and I may have forgotten
about it, I wanted to see the guard reports for thirty
days prior and the log book for thirty days prior.
MR. WILLIAMS:

We made that request and Mr.

Transtrura indicates to me that he did look for that.
THE WITNESS:

I made an effort to find that.

I do not know where that old log book would be.
Q

(By Mr. Harris)

A

No.

You can't find it at all?

I don't know as there was necessarily

any provision to keep those for any period of time when
they are filled up.
Q

I haven't kept them.

A couple of follow up questions on breaks

that I failed to ask you. We talked about what the
general practice was about breaks, rest rooms, what I
characterize as a coffee break, how long they took and
how many of them there were.

You would agree, do you

not, that these types of breaks are necessary and
beneficial to the employee?
A

Oh, absolutely.

Q

And they have got to have them?

A

Yes.
80

1

Q

Whether they be relieving themselves or

2

getting some nourishment, or just a few minutes of

3

quiet time, it is helpful to the employee?

4

A

It would be helpful.

5

Q

And also the same question with regards to

6

the employer, you also agree that having employees have

7

these types of breaks to do the things that we have

8

talked about were contained in the practice of Burns

9

there at Geneva is also important to Burns Security?

10
11

A

Well, it is important that these people be

comfortable while they are on the job, yes.

12

Q

And that allows them to perform their job

13

adequately?

u

A

I would.except that their break would be

15

taken in such a manner that they can perform their job

16

adequately, yes.

17
18

Q

And the fact that they would get a break

would help them perform their job adequately?

19

A

I would say yes.

20

Q

It would help everything from their

21

disposition to how they treat customers and the

22

clients?

23
24
25

A

Yes, they are people and people do like

breaks.
Q

And there is no question that there is some

81

1 I benefit to these breaks to Burns Security, the
2

employer?

3

A

Yes.

4

Q

With regard to Oreon Olson, does he still

5

work there at the plant?

6

A

Yes.

7

Q

I mean at Burns Security?

8

A

Yes.

9

Q

And does Jim Bezzant still work there?

10

A

Yes.

11

MR. HARRIS:

I would like to take both of

12

their depositions, if I could.

13

Mark Nielson works for BMT and Ben Olson is retired.

u

THE WITNESS:

15

MR. HARRIS:

16

My understanding is

That is true.
I have no further questions.
EXAMINATION

17

BY MR. WILLIAMS:

Q

I have just a few

18

questions.

Based on your knowledge and your current

19

position as captain and as lieutenant when you first

20

started in 1988, and upon your review of the Post

21

Orders, did you have any understanding from that review

22

of the Post Orders if the duties of a security guard

23

included using his or her private or personal vehicle

24

for Gate 4 for breaks in ordet to go off the plant

25

site?
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ADDENDUM 4
EXCERPTS OF EUGENE S. BEZZANT'S DEPOSITION

9
Q

Why not necessarily?

A

Because, I mean we can be off out of that building

and down checking a steel load or some other problem.
Q

And how far would you be checking a steel load?

A

Could be as far as a quarter of a mile to half a

mile.
Q

And so how long would you be away from the building

itself?
A

It depends on what the problem is.

Q

Could it be as long as 30 minutes?

A

No, sir.

Q

As long as 20 minutes?

A

Possibly.

Q

So it could be as long as 20 minutes, but usually

not as long as 30?
A

Generally.

Q

Do you know this gentleman who was just here whose

deposition we just took?
A

Yes.

Q

That was Oreon Olsen?

A

Yes, sir.

Q

Oreon said occasionally guards from gate four would

have to go down to lower gate four.
A

Correct.

Q

Okay.

How far is that?

10
A

I would say four or 500 yards.

I mean going by a

block Ifd say a block at least, a city block.
Q

Is the Frontier Cafe a city block away from gate

A

Yes, sir.

Q

Is it more than a city block?

A

No# sir*

Q

So itfs about the same as a city block?

A

That's correct, sir.

Q

It's about the same distance as going to lower gate

four?

four?
A

That's right.

Q

Did you have occasion to work gate four regularly

during the summer months of 1988?
A

Yes-

Q

Did you know Gloria Swenson at that time?

A

Yes.

Q

Did you consider her to be a good employee?

A

Yes.

Q

Did you consider her to be a good guard?

A

Yes.

Q

Do you have occasion to work in that little building

next to gate four?
A

I don't understand the question, sir.

Q

Well, you said there was like a five by five little

